Four critics to the classical categorization of propositions, metaphysically to necessary and contingent and epistemologically to A Priori and A Posteriori has been presented. A suggestion about science interpretation and also a suggestion about the literature has been offered.
The four critics are:
1- A causal relation that an individual feel(perceive) is necessary, though not all epistemologically A Posteriori is metaphysically contingent.
2- Mind Cannot Mistake.
3- The relation between perception with whether substance (Correspondence truth theory) or data (Coherence truth theory) is necessary that is not an A Priori proposition.
4- The transcendental propositions are priori, but in a naturalistic approach are not necessary.
Introduction
It has been supposed that what is metaphysically necessary, epistemologically is A Priori and what is metaphysically contingent, is epistemologically A Posteriori.Necessity, in logic and metaphysics, a modal property of a true proposition whereby it is not possible for the proposition to be false and of a false proposition whereby it is not possible for the proposition to be true. By the definition, that “all epistemologically A Posteriori propositions are metaphysically contingent” seems not true. The first three critics are about the claim. The last critics also is about the claim “all epistemologically A Priori propositions are metaphysically necessary” and its controversy.
Critics one
A causal relation that an individual feel is necessary, though not all epistemologically A Posteriori is metaphysically contingent.
What is neglected is the matter of “point of view”. Suppose this statement:
“I ate that food because I was hungry”
And from another point of view, this fact is:
“He ate that food because he was hungry”
The proposition 1 by definition is necessary, because this is impossible for the proposition to be false and also the proposition clearly is A Posteriori. But the second proposition is A posteriori and contingent. The point is the reason why the propositions has been categorized so, or equivalently how we defined necessary and contingent and A Priori and A Posteriori. There is another definition for the word necessary:
““It is necessary that P” is true just in case P is true in all possible worlds.”
Obviously the proposition 1 by the definition of necessity in term of possible worlds is not necessary. Because maybe in a world I don’t exists and consequently I would not have eaten the food because I was hungry.
The first definition of necessity is broader though interdefinable, and the second definition seems more comprehensive but it rejects some propositions seeming definitely true. Where is the problem? The first definition of necessity is more epistemological, though the second one is more metaphysical. Once Descartes told “I doubt in whatever I can doubt in.” The claim seeks for something or a proposition that cannot be doubted in. In this case, the word necessary is referring to answer of the question “what is that cannot be doubted in?”. But the second definition seems that seek the substructures of the nature or existence. The propositions like “A is A” are the samples fitting with the definition. Necessary in first definition is just proposition that cannot be doubted in, but in second definition is what that cannot be doubted in and is true independent to time. Thus the way you define necessity, is to choose the question you want to answer. If you define necessary proposition the one that it is impossible to be false, you want to answer the question “what is that cannot be doubted in?” and if you define it as true in possible worlds, you want to answer that “what is the substructure of the existence?”.
As a philosopher who seek knowledge and fond of what cannot be doubted in, a ground that could be stand on firm, against David Hume claim about uncertainty of the nature’s behavior, as if what that is neglected is the matter of point of view. That the nature is not necessarily in future behaves as the same with the past, doesn’t mean that all the A Posteriori propositions are contingent. Trying penetrate in the wall that David Hume revealed against metaphysical knowledge, the necessity of the kind of A Posteriori propositions that mentioned can be a reliable point.
Critics 2: The Mind Cannot Mistake.
Another matter of fact that is necessarily true:
The mind cannot mistake. If the mind is able to mistake, then knowing or possessing the knowledge, is impossible.
Suppose that the mind can mistake. Then all I am sure are necessary or true or contingent etc. can be not so, and no time I am able to know that, that I am true or not. Because anytime I want to claim a proposition, this is possible that I am mistaking. Though the mind that mistakes can’t correct itself, we have only two ways:
The mind cannot mistake.
This is impossible to know. (knowledge is impossible)
The second proposition denies also itself. Because in that case, the mind cannot say that it does a mistake. This is a position of silence. That the situation cannot be miserable is not a good reasoning. But if this is impossible to know, the proposition “A is A” is not A Priori and is not necessary. Then there are two possible condition:
1- The mind cannot mistake.
2- The proposition “A is A” is not necessary.
Whether truth or the matter of choice, one of the two is correct, our mind cannot mistake or we have shipwrecked in a long aged mistake by the age of history that “A is A”.
Critics 3: Relation Between mind and Subject.
“The relation between perception with whether substance (Correspondence truth theory) or data (Coherence truth theory) is necessary that is not an A Priori proposition.”
The claim “all matters of fact are contingent” doesn’t comply with any of the truth theory whether correspondence or coherence theory of truth.
Matters of Fact and the Correspondence theory of truth
Suppose this sentence. “the sun is rising from the east”. In the correspondence theory of truth, this sentence and the proposition “the sun is dawning from the west” are two true facts from two different point of view of one substantial or objective occurrences. Two are watching the sun in two places, one sees it is rising and another sees this is dawning. But the two are the same happenings. There is a happening in the substance or objective phase and the two men are experiencing that from their point of view. I claim that the relation between the objective or substantial happening and the subjective perception of that, due to the point of view is necessary. otherwise, our principle of the correspondence theory of truth is failed. Accepting this theory of truth, we have accepted the necessary relation between substantial or objective happenings with the subjective perceptions of that. Thus if we accept the correspondence theory of truth we must confirm that there are matters of fact (at least one) that are metaphysically necessary. Because the matter of correspondence of the subjective and objective is not a relation between ideas.
2- Matters of Fact and coherence theory of truth.
Suppose that proposition. “the sun is rising from the east”. In the coherence theory of truth, this proposition means the companions of some subjects. In coherence theory of truth, the propositions refer to the interrelations between the sense data we receive. My sense data distributes in individuals and kinds and my mind does this categorization. The proposition “the sea is blue” is tautological, because being blue is contained within the notion “sea”. And that this proposition is tautological means that we can’t access to beyond our perceptions or subjective understanding of the world. And we can’t deduce more than what we perceive from what we perceive. And the distinction between being blue and being the sea is that wherever we perceive the being blue with some other characteristics that construct the notion “sea”, we utter, “sea”.
The claim that matters of fact are contingent, the next time that I look at the sea, maybe I perceive it as red. Then what is the true proposition for this experience accepting the coherence theory of truth?
There are two possible answers:
The sea is red.
This is not the sea. (for instance, this is selp)
1-In first condition, when I say “the sea is red”, the notion of the sea must be the companion of some limited notions like water, and pilled etc. Though there is no substance or objective reality that the word “sea” refers to that, the notion “sea” in this proposition has to be defined within the subjects or data I receive. But if there is so and the definition of the word “sea” is the combination of some limited subjects, what is its border? This is like the old question that asks “how many hairs if a man has in his head, he is not bald?”.
2-If I utter, “that is not the sea anymore”, then again I must explain the true definition and border of the word sea. For instance, Is not the stormy sea, the sea anymore? Or if it is a bit polluted. Or at sunset, or at dawn. Then we conclude that we must have infinite words to only refer to the sea.
Considering the above questions, if we say the notion “sea” is the interrelation between the sense data, in a way that is comprehensible for mind, we must confirm that there is a mathematical equivalent of the word “sea” or this is at least seeming impossible to find a way to explain how we refer or how we distinguish the sea in sense data we receive.
If the sea is a special mathematical symmetry or order in sense data we receive, then there is an equivalent for the notion “sea”
That is hidden in sense data we receive and also the mind recognizes that as the sea.
We meet two questions here:
How does the mind know that mathematical symmetry or order?
Are these mathematical symmetry or orders existing independent of mind?
If we deny the existence of the other minds, that is the true serious way of philosophical investigation, these questions are hard to investigate.
But we concluded that the philosopher that accept the coherence theory of truth, has to confirm that there is mathematical equivalent for notions that are both in mind and hidden in sense data we receive. This approach seems Platonic (or maybe more looks like Aristotle way of thinking, only Aristotle thought the ideas are contained within individuals or substances, and we say mathematical symmetries or order are accompanied with sense data) because the mathematical symmetry or order must accompany with the data.
Then the mathematical symmetries or orders causes the perception and understanding of the notions.
Question: are the mathematical symmetries or orders cause the perceptions and understanding? If there is so, is this relation necessary?
There are two possible answers:
This relation is necessary.
This relation is contingent.
If the first condition, we see that in coherence theory of truth we must accept the matter of fact that is necessary.
In the second condition, we claim that an individual mathematical symmetry or order can cause different perceptions and understandings. Then it is possible to see the sea, human and human the sea. In this case, this is equivalent to say there is no such thing as sense data. If someone claims that the sense data exist, but what you perceive sea, can be human, this seems like a sophistication. Because this misunderstanding belongs to the realm of the correspondence theory of truth, not coherence. And if we deny the necessary relation between sense data and ideas and notions, this is like to say, there are two distinctive completely disconnected realms, and then we have no proof to prove the existence the sense data realm.
Then for one who claims the matter of facts is contingent is no way but to say, there is no sense data.
Question: Does sense data exists?
We mostly say, 1- there is one who perceives. 2- The sense data exists. 3- there is an equivalent subjective world correspond to that sense data.
We cannot deny the existence of the first one. If we accept the existence of the second and third one both, there is no way but to accept a necessary relation between the two realms. Thus there are two ways, that only one of them exists.
There is no sense data and the only subjective world exists.
There is no subjective world and only sense data exists.
We claim that there is no sense data and the only subjective world exists. (our claim is most skeptical and doesn’t suppose the existence of the other minds.)
Then we have a perceiver and a subjective world. Thus when I look at a flower there is not so that there is a sense data and I understand them as flower and beautiful etc. and I construct my world with that. The flower and beauty are the only things I am opposed to. The subjective world consists of a set of perceptions that occur through time. In such a world, there can’t be any choice. Because there is only the subjective world exists, and there is nothing else that I choose between the subjective world and that. Only this experience exists, and no other one that can be chosen. The world is a dream that passes me. If I see the flower has some calycles, it doesn’t mean that the flower has some calycles. The experience of noticing the calycles and the thought that I think the flower consists of calycles, is another experience and perception irrelevant to the first flower. My thoughts are also part of the subjective world. Because the unity of the first flower and the second one when I notice that it has some calycles exists, then the flower most somehow exists independent of me. (whether as data or as substance). Because I am relating two distinct ideas and perception to that. In the condition that we believe in just the sense data, the unity and persistence of the flower are based on the mathematical symmetry and order of flowers data that plays the rule like substance for the unity of the subject. Now I must answer if there is not so and those two flowers are not the same, how I have come up with the idea of the unity of the flower? We can say the idea also is part of the dream. In this way of thinking, this is not me that thinks, but the thoughts projects on my mind. I am only the observer of the perceptions and thoughts. Because in this way of thinking, thoughts are kind of perception and part of the subjective world. To think about the number of the flower’s calycles is contained the perception of the flower with some calycles and this implies the existence of some other subjective world independent of me that makes them objective. This result to accept necessity. Then, as a result, this self can also think. But what it does?
1-it doesn’t think. 2- it doesn’t choose. 3- it only perceives.
4-it has an illusion that it thinks.5- it has an illusion that it chooses.
How can it have a perception against the reality? It doesn’t think and has an illusion of thinking. It doesn’t choose and has an illusion of choice. I mentioned this point because I thought this is important, but I don’t understand the point.
Anyway, suppose that we have two subjective worlds and the self is able to select one of them, whether by thinking or choosing. The point is the distinction between the two worlds needs some distinctive parameters that must exist independent of them. And if it exists, must be independent to the self that it is no more the subjective world. On the other hand, if we accept that we have more than 1 subjective world, we have saved the choice, but at the cost of accepting the necessity. Because to choose a subjective world, makes that necessary. And if we have only 1 subjective world, then everything that happens in that world is necessary. Because this is only one. Then by accepting only one subjective world, we must accept a total necessity, but an empty one. This is like to say, everything that will happen, will happen.
A bit more precise we ponder in the matter of the subjective world.
If we have several subjective worlds, then they must have distinctive parameters. Then they would be something like sense data. Suppose that we have N choices that each one meets the self with a dilemma. In this case, we have subjective worlds that only one of them will be perceived. First, the rest must exist somewhere, that in this case, the existence is independent of the self. Then they are not subjective worlds, or at least an aspect of them is not subjective. Second, if a specific array of choices results in the specific subjective world, then there is a necessary relation between the subjective worlds and choices. And if we say there are N subjective world that based on our choice randomly we meet them, it means that they are one. Because of their distinctive parameter(choice) doesn’t affect them, though this is not choice anymore. And thus they are one. The common feature and distinctive parameters of the worlds are their characteristics. These characteristics in the case that these worlds exist, would be objective and each characteristic has a necessary relation with its world. Somehow they are sense data or something like that. Again that a special array would cause a special perception and subjective world. And in the case that we have only one subjective world, our effort in order to deny necessity of all matters of facts, results versus as a world that is completely necessary. Though there is only one world, everything that happens is necessary. In such a world we cannot say anything, and if we want we must say, the world is necessary.
Only sense data exists
In this case, we must consider the thoughts and emotions and elections also, sense data. Also, the flower is not the combination of colors and geometry, but the flower itself is a sense data. Also all our thoughts and imaginations about the flower. Because if we include combination and mind process, we must accept the two realms, and those combinations are not mere sense data anymore. This claim says that there is no subjective world that has necessary relation with sense data, but only sense data exists. And all we perceive is just sense data. This claim is the same as the only subjective world claim, and we just have altered the name.
The conclusion of the above reasoning
Finally, we see that we have no way but to accept the existence of the two realms both, Sense data and the Subjective world, and we have no way but to confirm that there is a necessary relation between these two realms. This relation is necessary and also a matter of fact. Then we see that in coherence theory of truth, we must accept at least the necessity of one matter of fact.
“Altogether, not all matters of fact are contingent.”
2)
Not all epistemologically A Priory is metaphysically necessary.
For instance, suppose this geometrical statement:
This statement is assumed as metaphysically true and epistemologically A Priori. But this is not true (this is a bit controversial that I will explain later). In large scales, larger than the scale we have grown in, we see that this is not true. For instance, amongst galaxies, the Pythagoras Geometry seems doesn’t work and in those scales, we must use another geometry theory. Also in quantum scales. The following explanation is illustrative as it is misleading.
Suppose that the ancient people use the Pythagoras Geometry in order to measure their lands. But when they add their lands area in the large distance, they see that that doesn’t correspond to their calculations. That’s because they don’t know that the earth isn’t flat and is a sphere. The same idea the majority of physicians believe about the universe. They think that the world hasn’t the flat space, but the curved one. But in the classic scale we live in, they tend to each other because the difference between the two theory is so little that we can’t observe.
That I said this explanation is also misleading is because of the sophistication that exists within this idea. Those people who measured the lands both claim is contained within the Pythagoras geometry and the fact that the earth is sphere isn’t it contrast with the Pythagoras geometry principles that we assumed epistemologically A Priori. But the nowadays physicians claim that space is not flat is in contrast with Pythagoras geometry. Maybe we have not pondered in this matter that which one we must be loyal to first, the epistemologically A Priori propositions or the
complying with our best theories A Posteriori equivalent propositions?
The atmosphere of this discussion is a bit hazy. A bit they talk about Kant and mind frame 3D space and a bit they talk about objective ND spaces. There are two ways to think about this matter and more than scientific, this is a philosophical question that which one is true.
The first way is to say, the world geometry doesn’t have to be 3D or Pythagoras space and this is our limitation that makes us perceive this world in 3D.
The reason we have for this claim is that our mature nowadays scientific theories are based on the geometries that aren’t 3D. Those formulas work as well and thus we say, the world geometry is so, so that we can’t have a sense about them, but they are so.
In this way, we have sacrificed our intuition that says the Pythagoras geometry is A Priori, in order to save our best theories relation with nature in a naturalistic way.
This is good to mention that this naturalistic insight hides a philosophy inside. Classical physics mostly comply with our intuitions about nature and geometry, and as we pierce in the world tiny objects in quantum mechanics, we see those rules doesn’t comply with our intuition. Also when we look at galaxies, again we see our intuitions as if cannot accept the facts that lie there. Only in classical physics, that works in the scale that our daily life currents, we see the compliance between our intuition and our theories.
A thought that seems most reasonable is that maybe what we call intuitions is nothing but the mind accustoms to this dimension regularity and orders. Like the marks on the stone that the river has shaped through the years, we have accustomed to those regularities that exist in our daily life experiences and thus, we call them intuitional. Thus when we look at dimensions that are new to us, we seem those phenomena like not unreasonable or in contrast with intuition. And yes, because they are new. This is what Kant mentioned as Transcendental Deduction that he believed is necessarily true. He thought that Newton’s Three Laws are from this kind that depicts the nature and also it's reasoning that while is intuitionally Apriori for us epistemologically, metaphysically is necessarily true. Emerging the classical structure failure later, it seemed that the idea of such propositions is completely wrong. But this is worth thinking that why we seek the classical dimension phenomena in the frame of theory intuitional and reasonable, while the other dimension’s facts make us confused.
It seems that nature learns us it laws and through time it learns us more and more how to see. And to understand physics isn’t to understand nature, but to understand the way we understand nature.
There is a problem with this idea. If we can’t rely on any of our intuitions, how can we judge about our theories? It seems the idea of pure mind hacked by nature, denies the possibility of knowledge also. The way we have is two ways:
Not all intuitions are made by nature, some of them are definite.
All Intuitions are true, we must doubt in our theories, not our intuitions.
If we choose the first condition, we must determine which intuitions are necessarily true and which one is taught by nature and not definite, and we must answer how we do this division.
And if we say the intuitions are true, this in that way we must explain the reason of power and compliance of our best theories
(quantum mechanics and relativity).
This approach is our second approach that I mentioned earlier.
The world geometry is Pythagoras geometry.
In this way, we want to be loyal to our intuitions and remedy our mature sciences or ponder more about what they mean.
We know that our mature sciences are holistic structures that comply best with our observations. But we know that we can doubt in them. Maybe there is structures and theories that comply with observation even better and not deny our intuitions. Then, in order to save our intuitions, we have three ways:
To deny the current theories.
We know that at least in theory, the existence of infinite theories that comply with the observation is possible. We can say they are there, even if we don’t know them now.
To think for other interpretations of our current science that don’t deny our intuitions.
The fact is that there are some formulas that work. Maybe this is wise to say, Ok, let me think more about them. Maybe they don’t mean what you say. Nowadays this is more like propaganda in the society and people love to hear stories about to go back through time and kill your grandfather and prevent your father to do that etc. But these stories are consequences of a poor realistic approach to those theories in order to make them reasonable and comprehensive truly depicting the universe theories. But maybe they aren’t meant to be reasonable. But those scientists and the people prevent to accept the consequences of those theories that of course are metaphysical claims. No one doubt that the epistemic world or the subjective one is 3D. But claiming that the objective world or metaphysical truth of the world is more than 3D, means to say that that is so we can’t understand and also this term is borrowed from the epistemic world and added some numbers to that. That may be just a poetic false function of mind like to make sentences like “the white object that is black is also red” or to say “the square that is both rectangle and triangle loves to be alone”. These all seem misleading in understanding the nature ahead of us.
To be antirealist about science.
To say that the science is not necessarily depicted the nature and reality is always an in hand position. But it is not a beloved approach.
At the end I must say that if we accept the current more accepted realistic approach to new sciences, we must say that not all the epistemologically A Priori propositions are metaphysically necessarily true, but we can also choose to be loyal to the A Priori propositions that mean to deny that science depict the reality or at least it needs a revision.
4)
Another matter of fact that is necessarily true:
The mind cannot mistake. If the mind is able to mistake, then knowing or possessing the knowledge, is impossible.
Suppose that the mind can mistake. Then all I think is necessary or true or contingent etc. can be not so, and no time I am able to know that. Because anytime I want to claim a proposition, this is possible that I am mistaking. Though the mind that mistakes can’t correct itself, we have only two ways:
The mind cannot mistake.
This is impossible to know. (knowledge is impossible)
The second proposition denies also itself. Because in that case, the mind cannot say that it does a mistake. This is a position of silence. Then it seems there is no way but to accept the true function of the mind. Consequently, we claim:
The mind cannot mistake.
This is a matter of fact that we cannot deny.
This is interesting to ponder more on this claim, that what it means while we all accept that sometimes we do wrong?
This question answer lies in the two notions: 1) Election. 2) Wrong Data.
Morally I think no one mistakes. We choose to mistake deliberately. And we are doing right. Also, the wrong data is a relative notion. Related to a purpose we call them wrong. But fundamentally data cannot be wrong. For instance, suppose that your eyes send wrong data of the equation written on a page to your brain. The brain cannot do a mistake, the eyes can, and the data also is not wrong, but just not fit our purpose.
Conclusion
It seems that this categorization, Metaphysically Necessary or Contingent, Logically Analytic and Synthetic, and Epistemologically A Priori or A Posteriori, is not efficient. Because the philosophy and purpose of this literature is our reliance on them, that how much we can count on them, it has been shown that they are not equivalent in the three area.
My suggestion is to use the word, known by Definite and Not Known by Definite instead of Necessary, A Priori and Analytic, or beside them to show the truth value of a proposition.
